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ESSAY




Constitutional economics is a field of science that is well
known to economists. In fact, a Nobel prize has been awarded in
this area.' However, Russian lawyers, including experts in
constitutional law, have generally only heard about it from others.
To understand the topic of constitutional economics, one must
Many of the sources cited herein have been translated by the author from
Russian to English.
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1. James M. Buchanan Jr. received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986
for applying contract and constitutional thinking to economic thinking to
economic theory and the political process. See Allen R. Sanderson, Wealth of
Notions, U. CHI. MAG., Dec. 2001 at 41; see also Nobel e-museum, James
Buchanan, at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/ (last modified June
16, 2000).
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struggle through the misunderstanding and legal nihilism' that has
prevailed in Russia for decades or even hundreds of years. The
constitutional economics approach allows for a combined
economic and constitutional analysis and avoids one-sided
approaches.
The term constitutional economics can be defined as the
compatibility of effective economic decisions with the existing
constitutional framework and the limitations or, conversely, the
favorable conditions created by that framework.' This definition
indicates an interrelation between economists and constitutional
lawyers. Another meaning was given by Yevgenii Yasin, a former
Minister of Economics and well-known Russian economist.
During a television discussion, he noted that lawyers are usually
right in disputes between lawyers and economists, but that
economists usually win in such disputes because if the country has
no money, nobody can enforce any legal provision.
The current debate over the status of the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation4 is a classic example of the use of constitutional
economics by lawyers and economists. This debate revolves
around the autonomy of the Central Bank and whether it should
come under the control of the State Duma of the Russian
2. V. B. Patukhov, The Power and Society in the Field of Elections, or Zero
Sum Games, POLLS J., 1999, available at
http://www.politstudies.ru/archive/1999/5/2-e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002)
("Political power in the country is self-sufficient and is able to reproduce itself
without civil society's participation. The power's self-sufficience [sic] results from
the lack of economic and legal base of federalism, from the lack of actual division
of powers, and from legal nihilism.").
3. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICIIONARY 174 (2d college ed. 1984); see also
James A. Montanye, Freedom of Speech: Constitutional Protection Reconsidered,
3 INDEPENDENT REV. 327 (1999) ("The Constitutional Rules that define the
framework within which nonmarket issues are decided, and which constrain the
scope of collective decision-making, are the focus of constitutional economics.");
Christian Kirchnez, The Principle of Subsidiary in the Treaty on European Union:
A Critique from a Perspective of Constitutional Economics, 6 TUL. J. INT'L. &
CoMp. L. 291, 293 (1998) (defining constitutional economics by applying the tools
of economics to constitutional problems).
4. See generally http://www.cbr.ru/eng/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2002). For a
history of the Central Bank and the Bank of Russia, see
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/today/history/gosbank.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
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Federation or whether it should remain an independent body.6
This Essay takes the position that the Central Bank should remain
independent in order to maintain its effectiveness. Part I discusses
the history and background of banking in Russia, while Part II
describes the various positions taken on the issue by various
academics, politicians, and practitioners. Finally, Part III explains
why the Central Bank should remain independent.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
RUSSIAN BANKING SYSTEM
A. Pre-1993 Constitutional Underpinnings
The idea of the Central Bank being an independent and
autonomous body is a notion that existed even before the current
Constitution7 was adopted in 1993.8 The previous Constitution
stated outright that "[t]he Central Bank is independent from
administrative and executive government bodies."9
The version of Article 75 of the 1993 Constitution that was
finally adopted clearly states that the Central Bank is independent
5. The State Duma is the lower house of the parliament of the Russian
Federation. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY (10th ed.
1998). See generally http://www.cityline.ru/politica/e/fs/gd.html (last visited Dec.
14, 2001).
6. Michael S. Bernstam & Alvin Rabushka, Will the Central Bank of
Russian Remain Independent, RUSSIAN ECON., Jan. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.russiaeconomy.org/comments/011001.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2002);
see also Igor Seenenko, Central Bank Hangs Tough in Face of Critics' Opposition,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 13, 2000, available at
http://www.sptimesrussia.com/secur/576/news/bcentral.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2002) ("[T]he Duma remains split on the issue of how the Central Bank's powers
should be curbed.").
7. KONST. RF (1993); see also Mark Baimbridge et al., The Bank that Rules
Europe? The ECB and Central Bank Independence (Bruges Group Occasional
Paper No. 37), available at http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/ecbl.htm ("The
idea that central banks should be independent from political influence has deep
historical roots . ").
8. The current constitution was adopted December 12, 1993. See David
Filipov, Russia Falls Deeper into Legal Quagmire, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 9, 1994.
9. KONST. RF (1977).
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from all state authorities, both executive and legislative, in the
performance of its main duty.'° It states, "[t]he protection and
stability of the ruble is the main function of the Central Bank of
the Russian Federation which it shall exercise independently from
other bodies of state power."" However, constitutionalists are
continuously challenged in their interpretation of Article 75 in the
absence of exact definitions of the terms "independence,"
"protection of the stability of the Ruble," and "stability of the
ruble," among others.'
2
The phenomenon of inattention to legislative terms has arisen
in various areas due to unforeseen gaps, inexact language and
casual phrasing.3  However, the Constitutional Conference
discussions of Article 75 demonstrate that the provision on the
independence of the Central Bank attracted much attention.'4 The
issue was repeatedly discussed,'5 as demonstrated below, and as a
result, Article 75 is reputed to be one of the sections in the
Constitution that accurately reflects the intent of the authors.
For example, during the 1993 Constitutional Conference, S.V.
Voblenko expressed concerns about Russia's future without an
independent bank, asking:
To whom does the bank answer? Whose decisions will it
follow? Under the Constitution, to whom does it answer? If
the Central Bank is to answer to the Supreme Council under
the new Constitution and it will be entitled to determine
monetary policy in Russia, then we will not only fail to save
Russia from collapse, but we will also drive the country to
10. Id. § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2 (1993).
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Peter Barenboim, Central Banking in Europe and in Russia,
INDICATOR, Oct. 2001, at 18 available at
http://www.micex.com/downloads/pubs/ind-1001/1001 18-23.pdf (last visited Jan.
12,2002).
13. Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions - Produce of an Eastern-
Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 66 (1998)
("[Tihe drafters of the new [post-Soviet] constitutions [] frequently made their
products indeterminate, vague, and complicated for readers untrained in
constitutional interpretation.").
14. See infra statement from the 1993 Constitutional Conference pp. 163-64.
15. See Barenboim, supra note 12, at 18.
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exhaustion. 6
B.A. Rakhimovich recognized that the Central Bank was
"created as an independent state agency and only in this
independence lies its value, otherwise it would be unable to
perform its duties...."" He also emphasized that the Central
Bank should not be subordinate to the President or the State
Duma so as to ensure the performance of its public duties."
Another participant noted that the "sole objective" of a
Central Bank "is the strengthening of the monetary unit of such
country" by issuing currency." The "Central Bank must be
independent, but its purpose should be the strengthening of the
monetary unit of the country. In this country, the Central Bank
sometimes assumes the duty to render assistance to enterprises and
to increase their working capital. This is not the Bank's business."'
S. S. Alekseev explained that the provisions of Article 75 of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation were:
formulated with the sole purpose of securing the freedom of the
market and restricting willfulness and arbitrariness of the
authorities. because if the authorities are not kept within
certain bounds and limits, such bounds will disappear, thereby
threatening the goals sought by instituting an independent
Central Bank. The Central Bank is an independent entity. The
Central Bank is not within any system of the state power; it is
not within either the executive or legislative branches and it is
generally an independent entity in the market economy and to
bind such entity with any rules would be, in my view,
inappropriate."
0. D. Davydov observed that "the most important issue of
stabilization of the economy is monetary emission. The struggle
16. Constitution Conference Short Hand Materials, vol. 3, at 228.
17. Id. vol. 20, at 261.
18. Id. vol. 4, at 431.
19. Id. at 432 (statement of V. F. Shumeiko). For an interview with Mr.
Shumeiko regarding Russia's economic plan, see
http://www.cipe.org/ert/e06/5shumei.php3 (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
20. Constitution Conference Short Hand Materials, vol. 4, at 172 (statement
of V. F. Shumeiko).
21. Id. at 431-34.
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between the Central Bank and the Government involves this
issue."' He explained that this is a long-term issue and that Article
75 concerns the welfare of all Russian people and enterprises.
According to B. S. Ebzeev, 3 independence is essential to a
functioning Central Bank, "otherwise the deputies [of the State
Duma] will constantly put pressure upon it."'24 Chairman S. A.
Filatov agreed with Ebzeev and proposed that the independence of
the Central Bank could be ensured by having its chairman
"appointed by the President and approved by the State Duma."'
This would prevent the State Duma from arbitrarily dismissing the
chairman without the President's acquiescence, thereby
guaranteeing a certain amount of independence.26 Similarly,
Chairman Y. F. Yarov boldly stated that the Central Bank
"answers to no one."
Chairman A. A. Sobchak29 noted that introducing "vague
wording into the Constitution is a very dangerous thing, and in this
case it would be better to expressly stipulate the status of such
specific organizations as the State Bank, their specific status and
lack of subordination [to the government, president and
parliament]."'
These comments extracted from the materials of the
Constitutional Conference clearly demonstrate that the authors of
the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation not only purposely
excluded the Central Bank from the system of separation of
powers, but also emphasized its independence from other state
structures, including the State Duma 1
22. Id. vol. 5, at 70-71.
23. B.S. Ebzeev currently serves as a Justice of the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation.
24. Constitutional Conference Short Hand Material, vol. 18, at 172.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 170-73.
27. For biographical information, see
http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/personer.exe?87 (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
28. Constitutional Conference Short Hand Material, vol. 3, at 228-29.
29. For biographical information, see
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/mar2OO0/sobc-mlO.shtml (last visited Jan. 11,
2002).
30. Constitutional Conference Short Hand Material, vol. 20, at 261-64.
31. Barenboim, supra note 12, at 18 ("The materials of the Constitutional
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B. Subordination: Conflicts between the Russian Federal Law on the
Bank of Russia and the Constitution
As the previous discussion demonstrates, Article 75 of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation, as it was ultimately
adopted, is devoted to the issue of the autonomy of the Central
Bank. Article 75 sets forth its tasks and main duties and clearly
states that the primary duty of the Central Bank is to protect the
stability of the ruble." In order to fulfill this duty, Article 75
explicitly states that the Central Bank is independent from other
state authorities.
33
However, to the contrary, Article 5 of the Russian Federal
Law on the Bank of Russia establishes the principle of the
subordination of the Central Bank to the State Duma"4 Article 5
explicitly states that the "Bank of Russia shall be accountable
["podotcheten"] to the State Duma.... , As such, Article 5 has
Conference evidence that the authors of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation emphasized [the Central Bank's] independence from other state
structures, including the State Duma.").
32. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75 (1993); see also Gary Peach, Central Bank
Should Be Target of Quick Action, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000,
available at http://www.sptimesrussia.com/secur/558/news/b-central.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2002) ("Gerashchenko [Chairman of the Central Bank] has deftly
used a combination of administrative measures and jawboning to protect the
ruble .... ).
33. KONsT. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75.
34. Id. pt. 1.
35. Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia) No. 394-1, art. 5 (Dec. 2, 1990), available at
http://www.gbld.org/downloads/Russia/CBL.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
Specifically, Article 5 states:
The Bank of Russia shall be accountable to the State Duma of the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation. The accountability of the Bank of Russia
to the State Duma shall mean:
the appointment to and relief of the post of the Chairman of the Bank of Russia
by the State Duma on the presentation by the President of the Russian
Federation;
the appointment to and relief of the post by the State Duma of the members of
the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia (hereinafter referred to as the
Board of Directors);
the submission by the Bank of Russia to the State Duma for consideration of
the annual report, and also of the auditing opinion;
the appointment by the State Duma of an auditing firm for conducting an
2001]
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been interpreted as subordinating the Bank of Russia to other state
bodies. This interpretation of Article 5 is rooted in the past and
requires all governmental bodies to be subordinate to the
Parliament. 6 In this case, the Bank is for some reason subordinate
to only one chamber of the Parliament.37  This approach
contravenes the spirit and the letter of the current Constitution.
The provisions dealing with subordination of the Bank of
Russia are inconsistent with Article 75 of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation Part 1, which establishes that "monetary
emission is to be effected exclusively by the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation."38 The monopoly of the Bank of Russia in
monetary emission is incompatible with any intervention in such
activity, which will be inevitable if the Central Bank is subordinate
to the State Duma.
Moreover, Part 2 of Article 75 of the Constitution39 further
auditing check of the Bank of Russia;
the conduct of parliamentary hearings on the activity of the Bank of Russia
with the participation of its representatives;
the reports of the Chairman of the Bank of Russia to the State Duma on the
activity of the Bank of Russia (two times a year: when submitting the annual
report and the basic lines of the single State monetary-credit policy).
The Bank of Russia, within the limits of the powers granted to it by the
Constitution of the Russian Federation and by the federal laws, shall be
independent in its activity. The federal bodies of State power, the bodies of
State power or the entities of the Russian Federation and the bodies of local
self-government shall have no right to interfere in the activity of the Bank of
Russia in the realization of its legislatively fixed functions and powers, or to
take decisions contrary to the present Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia shall submit to the State Duma and to the President of the
Russian Federation information in the procedure established by the federal
laws.
In case of interference in its activity, the Bank of Russia shall inform thereof
the State Duma and the President of the Russian Federation.
The Bank of Russia shall have the right of application to courts with actions for
invalidating the legal acts of the federal bodies of State power, the bodies of
State power of the entities of the Russian Federation and the bodies of local
self-government.
Id.
36. Barenboim, supra note 12, at 19.
37. The Upper Chamber of Parliament is the Council of Federation. See
generally, http://www.council.gov.ru/indexe.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
38. KONST. RF. § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 1.
39. For relevant text of Article 75, Part 2, see supra Part I.A.
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establishes the principle of independence of the Central Bank in
the performance of its fundamental duty - the protection of the
ruble and assurance of its stability.' It is clear that there is a
conflict between the principle of independence in Article 75 and
the doctrine of subordination implied in Article 5.
The doctrine of the combination of "independence"" and
"subordination,"' 2 as declared, in Article 5 of the Law on the Bank
of Russia creates the possibility of an interpretation of the
Constitution that would subordinate the Central Bank to the State
Duma.
The text of the Constitution, the comments thereon, and the
practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
provide an unambiguous interpretation of the conflict between
Article 75 and Article 5, as it applies to the independence of the
courts. Both assert the incompatibility of the independence of
courts with their accountability, subordination or dependence to
any other authorities.
The Central Bank is the only constitutional body, other than
the courts, to which the term "independence" applied within the
Constitution. 3 Therefore, use of the subordinate doctrine and its
interpretation of the terms "independence" and "podotchetnost"44
with respect to the courts will create a nightmare for Russian
constitutional development.
C. Relevant Terminology
Russian constitutional law has distinct meanings for the terms
independence and autonomy. When interpreting the Constitution
and when considering the legal status of central banks, accurate
legal terminology must be used. 5 The following are several
definitions to consider when discussing Russian constitutional
40. KONST. RF. § 1, ch.3, art. 75, pt. 2.
41. Id. at pt. 5.
42- Id.
43. Compare KONST. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2 (discussing the independence
of the Central Bank) with KONST. RF § 1, ch. 7, art. 120 (discussing the
independence of the Russian courts).
44. See KONST. RF. § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2.
45. Cf. Ludwikowski, supra note 13, at 66.
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interpretation in the Central Bank debate context.
The term "fundamental duty" is used only in Article 75 of the
Constitution regarding the breadth and scope of the tasks of
protecting and ensuring stability of the ruble. ' The term should be
construed in the same sense as the "fundamentals of legislation,"
"fundamental law,"' 7 and "foundation,"' which are all construed as
referring to basic or essential functions. The fundamental duty
includes not only monetary emission and determination of the
credit and monetary policy, but also the maintenance of the
stability of the banking system, formation of the gold and currency
reserves, and judicially appealing the acts of other authorities."9
Determining a power for the Bank of Russia that does not entail
"fundamental duty" is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The Russian word podotchetnost, usually translated as
accountability, actually implies some kind of subordination in
Russia.' It has been explained by Dr. Willem F. Duisenberg,
President of the European Central Bank in the following manner:
A central bank independent of short-term political concerns is
best placed to pursue a medium-term-oriented monetary policy
aimed at the maintenance of price stability which, in turn, will
best serve overall economic prospects and the interests of the
public at large .... At the same time, as central bankers, we
should and do recognize that the achievement of institutional
independence implies the assumption of greater responsibilities.
An independent- central bank must acknowledge that it is
ultimately responsible for the matters delegated to it by
parliament or government, as identified in its legal statutes ....
In the Oxford English Dictionary, a "responsible" institution is
defined as one that is "liable to be blamed for loss or failure."
Accountability is the mechanism by which independent central
banks expose themselves to public scrutiny and thereby accept
their liability for any shortcomings in the design and
implementation of monetary policy. Against this background,
46. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75.
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 272 (Pocket ed. 1996) ("The basic, organic
law that establishes the governing principles of a nation or state").
48. Id. at 266 ("The basis on which something is supported.").
49. See generally http://www.cbr.ru/eng/today/status-functions/ (last visited
Jan. 16, 2002).
50. Barenboim, supra note 12, at 22.
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accountability can be seen as natural counterpart of central
bank independence.51
This interpretation is also applicable to Russian constitutional
law. Construing constitutional economics under this interpretation
accepts the accountability of central banks to parliamentary bodies.
Another definition of independence is "freedom from the
influence, control, or determination of another or others."'52 In
English, "accountable" is defined as "responsible" and
"explanatory."53 The English word "accountability" has a different
meaning than the commonly accepted Russian term
"podotchetnost."'  Each has a different connotation in Russian
and English. This could create misunderstandings between
Russian and Western experts.
Tonny Lybek of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF")"
has noted that some prefer the term autonomy to the frequently
used term independence, as autonomy simply entails operational
freedom, while independence indicates a lack of institutional
constraints. 6
III. THE DEBATE OVER WHETHER OR NOT TO AMEND ARTICLE 75
The Central Bank is one of the most important organs of
financial and economic policy of the state and is also an essential
constitutional body. In the past, the issues concerning the Central
Bank's role and its relations with other government authorities in
the determination of economic and financial policy priorities were
only theoretical in nature. Recently, the issue of Central Bank
51. Barenboim, supra note 12, at 22.
52. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 686 (3rd college ed. 1994).
53. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 8 (10th ed. 1998)
54. Barenboim, supra note 12, at 22; see also text accompanying note 50.
55. See generally http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2002).
56. See TONNY LYBEK, CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY, AND INFLATION AND
OUTPUT PERFORMANCE IN THE BALTIC STATES, RUSSIA, AND OTHER
COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, 1995-97, WP/99/4 (IMF Working
Paper, Jan. 1999), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/199 9/wp 99 04 .pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2002).
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independence has become the subject of increased legislative
discussions; amendments to the Law on the Central Bank are being
proposed by parliamentarians, who are seeking to rewrite the
language of the Constitution. 7 The proposed changes to the
Central Bank status have also been discussed by the Constitutional
Court. In December 2000, the Constitutional Court made a
significant decision affecting the constitutional status of the Central
Bank, declaring that "the Bank of Russia has a special
constitutional legal status.""8
There is no question that the main task of the Central Bank is
to protect the exchange rate of the ruble.59 The exchange rate
depends not only on intervention in the currency market, money
emissions,' and interest rates," but also on the economic
environment.62 Therefore, the Central Bank should devote itself to
57. For instance, Parliamentarians introduced amendments that consider the
Bank of Russia a regular state body with full independence from the government.
They also introduced an amendment to take a sufficient number of functions
from the Board of the Bank of Russia. See Central Bank Status Remains Under
Question, INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000.
[The] Head of the Duma Banking committee, Alexander Shockin, and the head
of the Duma economic policy committee, Sergei Glasyev, propose[] that the
status of the Central Bank should be determined as that of a federal state power
body. There [are] also proposals to leave the status of the Central Bank as
laid out in the current version of the law on the Central Bank, and also to make
the bank a state institution.
Id.
58. Decree of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Dec. 14,
2000); see also Barenboim, supra note 12, at 18 (noting that the Court found the
main purpose of the Central Bank was to protect the exchange rate of the ruble
and that the Bank should devote itself to economic development and the creation
of economic incentives for growth).
59. KONsT. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2 (1993); see also supra text accompany
note 10-11.
60. Russia: 'Eating the Bitter Bread of Banishment,' W. MERCHANT BANK
INVESTMENT REV., Feb. 23, 1999, at 46 ("A wave of monetary emission will spur
inflation and put strong downward pressure on the exchange rate.").
61. Molly Schuetz, ECB's Quaden Says Markets 'More Realistic' on Euro,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 19, 2000 (quoting ECB President Guy Quaden as
saying that "a recovery in the exchange rate has come to pass, and its
amplification will depend principally on the convergence of interest rates.... ").
62. Economic Policies; Norway, OECD ECON. SURVEYS NOR., Mar. 1997, at
3 ("Exchange rate stability is deemed to... create a stable economic
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
achieving and maintaining the strength of the economy and
providing incentives for economic growth. Unfortunately, given
the scope of the Central Bank's role, some people are trying to
influence its monetary and credit policy for their own purposes.
A. International Definitions of Independence and Accountability
Modem economic literature tends to discuss the independence
of monetary and credit policy of the Central Bank in terms of
objectives the Bank can independently establish and instruments
the Bank can choose for its regulation.63 Many articles in
prestigious theoretical Western journals address the issue of the
independence of central banks. '
The most useful explanation of the independence and
accountability of central banks has come from practitioners. At
the Bicentennial Symposium of the Banque de France's 200th
anniversary in May 2000, speakers and participants stressed that
the institutional independence of central banks is based not only
on economic theory and empirical studies, but is also the product
of pragmatic historical evolution.65 This independence has been
established both with respect to political authorities, such as the
environment .... ).
63. See Alberto Alsina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence
and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 151 (1993), available at http://www.j-bradford-
delong.net/Teaching-Folder/Econ-202bF2000/papers/Alesina,-CBI.pdf (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002); see also The Central Bank Cannot be Divided Between the
State Duma, the President, and the Government, KOMMERSANT (Nov. 3, 2001).
64. See, e.g., Rosa Maria Lastra, The Division of Responsibilities Between the
European Central Bank and the National Central Banks Within the European
System of Central Banks, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 167 (2000); Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433
(1998); Christos Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, the European
System of Central Banks, and Banking Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of the
Maastricht Treaty, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105 (1997).
65. See Dr. Willem F. Duisenberg, From the EMI to the ECB, Speech
Delivered at the Banque de France's Bicentennial Symposium (May 2000),
available at http://www.ecb.int/key/00/sp000530.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002)
("The experience of the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the advantage of central
bank independence in the pursuit of price stability.").
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government and Parliament," and private interests.6 7 It implies a
regular dialogue between the Central Bank and political
authorities to reduce any potential conflicts between monetary and
fiscal policies. Practically speaking, independence requires a
collegial decision-making process and establishes methods of
external institutional communication.'
The participants of Symposium noted that the concepts of
"independence" and "accountability" were developing over the
past thirty years.69  However, these terms are commonly used
today. Accountability is the necessary counterpart to the
independence of central banks granted by public authorities. It
entails a duty of communication, 7 transparency, 7' and respect for
the assigned mandate. Independence implies the establishment of
a dialogue between the Central Bank and the political institutions.
However, according to participants of the Symposium, central
banks are directly accountable only to the general public. 72 It is
66. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2 (1993).
67. See Ron Synovitz, World Bank Reports on Corruption, Name Worst
Offenders, RADIO FREE EUROPE, RADIO LIBERTY, Sept. 27, 2000, available at
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/09/27092000185851.asp (last visited Jan.
16, 2002) ("The World Bank says private vested interests are hijacking economic
reforms in much of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.").
68. Jeane-Claude Trichet, Opening Speech of the Commemorative
Bicentennial Symposium of the Banque de France, (May 30, 2000), available at
http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/telechar/05302000.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2002)
("[Central Bank] independence does not mean a lack of dialogue.").
69. Id.
70. See Gordon Thiessen, Accountability and Transparency in Canada's
Monetary Policy, Remarks to the Metropolitan Halifax Chamber of Commerce,
Jan. 27, 2000, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/200lO419/default.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002) ("[A]ccountability in monetary policy require[s]
effective communication.").
71. See Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Transparency in Central Banking: Rationale
and Recent Developments, Remarks Before the National Economists Club and
Society, Apr. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010419/default.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002) ("Transparency facilitates a broad understanding of
what the central bank is doing and thereby gives the public the tools to hold the
independent central bank accountable.").
72. See Trichet, supra note 68.
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their duty to communicate, through press conferences, by
publishing comprehensive analyses in periodic bulletins, through
regular parliamentary hearings or media interviews. 3  The
President of the Banque de France, Jean-Claude Trichet, summed
this up by saying "[t]he independent Banque de France is
accountable to French public opinion, the European Central Bank
to the 293 million Europeans, and the Federal Reserve Bank to the
265 million Americans."7
As demonstrated below, this new trend in 21st century central
banking is still completely misunderstood in Russia by the current
Legal Department of the President, Government, and State Duma.
B. The Correlation between the Independence of a Central Bank
and Inflation
The theory that independence of central banks is a necessary
condition for facilitating a decline in inflation rates is commonly
accepted.75 Some are of the opinion that a policy combating
73. See Barenboim, supra note 12, at 22.
74. Trichet, supra note 68.
75. See Stanley Fischer, Central Banking: The Challenges Ahead: Maintaining
Price Stability, available at
www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/1296/articles/0101296.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2002); see also Mark M. Spiegel, British Central Bank Independence and Inflation
Expectation, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Federal Reserve Board San Francisco, San
Francisco), Nov. 28, 1997, available at
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-36.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2002)
("A substantial body of economic literature predicts that the more independent a
country's central bank is, the lower the inflation rate is in that economy.");
William J. McDonough, Remarks at the Society of Investment Analysts (Feb. 11,
1997), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/speeches/wm970211.html (last visited Jan.
11, 2002) ("Empirical research in recent years has shown that both the average
rate of inflation and its variability tend to decline in tandem with increased
independence for central banks."); Carl Walsh, Is There a Cost to Having an
Independent Central Bank?, FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER, Number 94-05 (Feb. 4,
1994), available at
http://www.bus.lsu.eduleconomics/faculty/dmcmillin/personal/4560/indepcenbank
.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002); Alsina & Summers, supra note 63. But see
Baimbridge, supra note 7. "The establishment of an independent central bank
with strong anti-inflationary preferences is seen as a way for the state to bind its
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inflation increases unemployment 76 and slows down economic
growth.77 One study has shown that there is no adverse effect on
employment and industrial development from the independence of
central banks. However, there is no such negative correlation.
When a central bank carries out a clear deflationary policy,
significant rigidities appear.79 According to Russian economist Dr.
hands against the electoral temptation of inducing unanticipated increases in the
price level." See Baimbridge, supra note 7 (questioning whether an independent
central bank truly results in lower inflation).
76. See Laurence H. Meyer, Inflation Targets and Inflation Targeting,
Remarks at the University of California at San Diego Economics Roundtable
(July 17, 2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/speeches/2001/20010717/default.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2001) ("At times, an increase in the unemployment rate may
be required to sustain stable, low inflation."). But see Nouriel Roubini, The
NAIRU Debate: Can the US Economy Grow Above 2.5% and Unemployment
Fall Below 5% Without Causing an Increase in Inflation, (1998), available at
http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/-nroubini/NAIRU.HTM (last visited Jan. 16, 2002)
("[T]here is no evidence that the inflation rate is accelerating [sic] these days
[with unemployment decreasing]."); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF, ET AL., Low
INFLATION OR No INFLATION? SHOULD THE FEDERAL RESERVE PURSUE
COMPLETE PRICE STABILITY?, (The Brookings Institution, Policy Brief No. 4,
Aug. 1996), available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/PolicyBriefs/pb0O4/pb4.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002) ("The costs of maintaining zero inflation would be a
permanent reduction in gross domestic product of 1 to 3 percent and a permanent
drop in employment by the same amount.").
77. See Michael O'Higgins Says Bonds Can Beat the Dow: Bloomberg Forum,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 19, 1999 (stating that money manager Michael
O'Higgins believes that "low inflation may signal slow economic growth."). But
see Thomas M. Hoenig, Low Inflation and the Economic Outlook Comments
before the National Association of Business Economists (Jan. 22, 1998), available
at http://www.kc.frb.org/spch&bio/outlook.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002) (noting
that low inflation increases economic growth).
78. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fisher, How Independent Should a Central Bank
Be?, in GOALS, GUIDELINES AND CONSTRAINTS FACING MONETARY POLICY
(1994).
79. Cf. JORG BIBOW, MAKING EMU WORK: SOME LESSONS FROM THE 1990'S
(Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 326, Mar. 2000),
available at http://www.levy.org/docs/wrkpap/papers/326.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2002) ("Allegedly, a lack of labour market 'flexibility' and wide-spread
'structural rigidities' represent the root cause of European unemployment, at
least if Europe's central bankers were to be believed.").
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Revold Mikhailovich Entov, ° the costs of such anti-inflationary
policy are slightly higher for independent banks, but economists
still have been unable to offer a satisfactory explanation.
In a report for the Monetary and Exchange Affairs
Department of the IMF in February 1999, Tony Lybek discusses
the correlation between autonomy and accountability and inflation
rates in Russia and other former Soviet states. He concluded that
"the implementation of monetary policy to an autonomous and
accountable central bank with a clearly defined primary objective"
can significantly improve the "credibility of monetary policy."'
C. Central Bank Reserves
The maintenance of reserves of any central bank is a primary
political and economic priority of all nations.83 In Russia, there is a
strong liberal opposition to the policies of the Chairman of the
Bank of Russia, Victor Gerashchenko, who has made the increase
of Central Bank reserves a cornerstone of his financial policy.'
The country must pay back almost twenty billion dollars of foreign
debt in 2003.5 This incredible amount of debt underscores the
importance of maintaining ample reserves for the stability of the
80. Dr. Revold Mikhailovich Entov is a Professor of Economics at the
Moscow State University and is a full member of the Russian Academy of
Science. He specializes in macroeconomic theory and has contributed to the
drafting of bills and other legislative material for the Russian government. For
biographical data, see www.iet.ru/person/entov-en.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2002).
81. See Lybek, supra note 56.
82- Id. at 17.
83. See M. R. Chatu Sonakul, National Central Bank and World Peace,
Speech at the 27" International Conference on World Peace (Dec. 1, 2000),
available at http://www.bis.org/review/r001205c.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2000).
84. Central Bank Chair Gerashchenko Says Optimal Level of Gold and
Currency Reserves is $45-$48 Billion, RUSSIAN Bus. MONITOR, June 18, 2001
("Central Bank Chair Victor Gerashchenko [of] the Central Bank plans to
increase gold and currency reserves.").
85. Kathleen Knox, Russia: Economy Rebounds From 1998 Slide, RADIO
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, Aug. 20,2001, available at
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/08/20082001122737.asp (last visited Jan.
20, 2002) ("[P]roblems ahead include the so-called '2003 problem,' when Russia
will have topay back around $18 billion of foreign debt.").
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national economy. As Russian oligarchss6 are not held responsible
for the financial stability of Russia, some political observers,
including Michael Delyagin, Director of Research of the Institute
of Problems of Globalization, believe that the Russian oligarchs
would support a second national default in 2003.' The political
observers argue that because nobody was held accountable after
the default of August 1998,' the oligarchs would be gratified by a
new default, thereby weakening the position of the new Russian
President. As Gerashchenko's policy is designed to avoid a 2003
default, the oligarchs have implemented this campaign to reduce
the independence of the Bank of Russia, and thereby undermine
his policy. A Financial Times article, entitled "Putin May Force
Russia's Central Bank Chief to Quit," stated:
Victor Gerashchenko, the veteran chairman of Russia's central
bank, might be forced to quit within the next six months as
President Vladimir Putin strengthens his grip on the financial
levers of power, according to a senior Russian official.
In an interview with the [Financial Times] last December, Mr.
Gerashchenko said he was the most independent central banker
in the world because he had already passed his retirement age
and was not afraid of being sacked.
Contrary to most expectations, Mr. Gerashchenko maintained a
tight grip on monetary policy in the wake of the rouble's
devaluation in August 1998.' 9
Another Financial Times article, published a short time later
and entitled, "Russian Central Bank in Role Cut," explained that:
The Central Bank of Russia will guard its independence on
86. See Leon Aron, Waiting for December, RUSSIAN OUTLOOK, 1999,
available at http://www.aei.org/ro/ro10351.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2002) (noting
that the oligarchs include "corrupt government officials and top entrepreneurs.").
87. Michael Delyagin, New Oligarchs Prepare a New Default, IZVESTIA, Mar.
7, 2001.
88. See How Russia's Crisis Makes State Banking More Competitive,
INTERFAX, Jan. 13, 1999.
89. Andrew Jack et al., World News - Europe: Putin May Force Russia's
Central Bank Chief to Quit, FIN. TIMES (London), May 23, 2000, at 8.
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monetary policy but may lose its autonomy over commercial
bank regulation, the country's finance minister said at the
weekend.
In an interview, Alexei Kudrin, who is also a deputy prime
minister and ally of President Vladimir Putin, dismissed recent
speculation that the governor of the Central bank would be
made directly subordinate to the government, in a move which
might threaten the stability of the rouble.
... Mr. Kudrin's comments came after widespread debate in
recent days over a draft parliamentary law on the central bank,
which has sparked strong opposition from individuals including
Viktor Gerashchenko, its governor. Parliament has long sought
greater control over the central bank, while Mr. Gerashchenko,
subject to frequent rumours about his dismissal, has clashed
over his management of the rouble with Mikhail Kasyanov, the
Prime Minister.9'
At the same time and despite Mr. Kudrin's statements, the
President of Russia introduced new amendments to alter the legal
status of the Bank of Russia.9' These amendments seek to convert
the National Banking Council, which is now a consulting body to
the Bank of Russia,' to the highest governing body of the Central
90. Andrew Jack, Russian Central Bank in Role Cut, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2000, at 3.
91. See The Government's Golden Grab: Stripping Central Bank's
Independence Won't Cure its Debt Woes, RUSSIA J., Mar. 17, 2001, available at
http://www2.russiajournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=4407 (last visited Jan. 19,
2002).
92. Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia) No. 394-1, art. 21 (Dec. 2, 1990), available at
http://www.gbld.org/downloads/Russia/CBL.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
Article 21 states that the National Banking Council:
shall consider the concept of improving the banking system of the Russian
Federation;
shall consider the drafts of the basic direction of the single State monetary-credit
policy, the policy of the currency regulation and the currency control, shall give
opinions thereon and shall analyze the results of their fulfilment [sic];
shall conduct the expert examination of the draft legislative and any other
normative acts in the field of banking;
shall consider the most important matters of regulating the activity of the credit
organizations;
shall participate in ihe elaboration of the basic principles of organizing the system
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Bank." With the advent of these amendments, many major
functions of the Board of the Bank of Russia would be shifted to
the new twelve-seat National Banking Council." The seats in the
National Banking Council would be designated as follows: the
State Duma will have five seats in the new National Banking
Council, the President of Russia will control three seats, and the
Government will have three seats." Apparently, these
amendments were preliminarily approved by lawyers of the Office
of the Administration of the President and could be considered by
the Parliament by the end of the 2001-2002 session, which
concludes during the Summer of 2002.
Mikhail Zadornov, Chairman of the State Duma
Subcommittee for Monetary Policy, Currency Regulation and
Central Bank Activities and Former Minister of Finance," is one of
of settlements in the Russian Federation.
Id.; cf Yelena Kolkoltseva, Yelsin Approves Banking Law, Moscow NEWS, May
5, 1995 ("The National Banking Council, which includes representatives from the
Federation Assembly, presidential administration and government, has mere
ceremonial functions.").
93. See Duma Does Not Want to Deprive Central Bank of Independence,
RUSSIAN BUS. MONITOR (Nov. 14, 2001) (citing VREMYA NOVOSTEY, Nov. 13,
2001, KOMMERSANT, Nov. 13, 2001, POLIT.Ru, Nov. 13, 2001).
94. See Amendments to Law on CBR Should Go Back to First Reading, Bus.
REP., Nov. 28,2001.
It is planned that NBC will receive lots of powers, such as the right to approve
annual statements of the Central Bank and estimates of its expenditures; to
approve the conceptual plan of national banking system development and
annual projects of monetary and crediting policy; to solve problems related to
participation of the Central Bank in the capital of crediting organizations; to
appoint the main auditor of the Central Bank and to study its report; to discuss
quarterly reports of the Board of Directors about the operations of the Central
Bank; to choose an auditor for the annual statement; to approve the accounting
rules for the banking system and for the Central Bank itself.
Duma Does Not Want to Deprive Central Bank of Independence, supra note 93.
95. See Victor J. Yasmann, Russia Voices Reservation About Kyoto Protocol;
New Focus on Kaliningrad, RUSSIA REFORM MONITOR, July 27, 2001, available at
http://www.afpc.org/rrm/rrm858.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2002) ("[T]he CB will
remain nominally independent from the state, but will be subordinated to the
newly-creating [sic] National Banking Council, composed of ranking deputies of
the Duma and members of the presidential administration and the
government.").
96. For biographical information, see
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the active members of Parliament who opposes new amendments
to the Law on the Central Bank introduced in July 2001. He made
the following comments to the Moscow News:
The presidential amendments to the Law on the Central Bank of
Russia place the Bank under the government's control. This is
an alarming sign.
The law of 1995 afforded the Central Bank complete
independence, including in the monetary and credit sphere. And
the Russian Constitution states that the [Central Bank] is linked
to the executive and legislative branches only to the extent that
the Bank acts jointly with the government in the conduct of
monetary policy, while the State Duma may only examine the
Bank's annual reports and appoint an auditor to prepare a
resolution on the reports. An independent Central Bank is
definitely to Russia's advantage. Given the unstable budgetary
and financial system, the government and parliament are in the
habit of solving their numerous financial problems in ways that
run counter to the country's real capability. Hence the chronic
budget deficit of the 1990s. A dependent Central Bank would be
obliged to comply with the irrational policies of the powers that
be, while an independent one can put a brake on public spending
and help curb inflation.
We need a new law on the Central Bank to resolve numerous
questions. But it is not easy to adopt such a law, for we have
two extreme and opposed viewpoints on the necessity to alter
the banking system and the Central Bank's role. One is the
[Central Banksl's own opinion - everything is just fine, and so
there is no need to alter anything. The other view is that the
[Central Bank] should become a government institution,
virtually another ministry.
After two years of debate, this past summer the Duma managed
to pass a compromise version of the relevant bill on its first
reading. But before it could go through the second reading,
there appeared the presidential amendments, which reflect the
state's extreme viewpoint. They boil down to this: The Central
Bank is a government body and an instrument of the state at
http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/People/Zador/zador.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
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the same time; all the property in the bank's charge is federal
property allotted to it for day-to-day management; until the
Central Bank disposes of its stakes in Russian overseas banks
and several banks inside the country, something current law
requires it to do, the government may at any moment take
under its own management the shares in these banks kept with
the [Central Bank].
Here we can detect the government's desire not only to avoid
constant friction with the CB, but also to incorporate the Bank
into the general system for making authoritative decisions. My
conviction is that such a move would deal a serious blow to both
economic and political stability of Russia ....
A Central Bank in a ministerial role would be incapable of
conducting an independent policy that can act as a kind of
counterweight. It is easy to predict the consequences of such a
scenario: Again galloping inflation, sky-high prices, a weak
ruble, and growing poverty countrywide.
There is nothing new in all that - many countries have
experienced such rebounds after major efforts to reform the
state. These are all the more inevitable in Russia because
reform has benefited at most 15 percent of the population,
while the rest have grown poorer. About 40 percent of those
who voted for Vladimir Putin believed that they had been
deprived of their rightful share, and that the recarving of the pie
would bring them a bigger share than they had got over the last
ten years. The president is well aware of that sentiment. He
also knows that if the pie is to be reshared, it is not enough
merely to centralize power. The thing to be carved up anew
must also be centralized. This is the big idea behind the desire
to change the status of the Central Bank.
... Because Russia lacks effective checks and balances in both
the economy and politics, we would risk losing the few things
that lend stability to the country: mass media independent of
the government, an influential parliament, and an independent
Central Bank.97
97. Mikhail Zadarnov, Central Bank Must Keep Its Independence, Moscow
NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000.
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Fortunately, the aforementioned amendments still have not
passed the Russian Parliament.
D. Contending with the Political Climate
Throughout Russia, there is much political speculation
regarding the effects of the expiration of Mr. Gerashchenko's term
in September 2002.98 At least half a dozen economists from both
the executive and legislative branches are prepared to take his
place." Comments in various newspapers suggest that if the
independence of the Bank of Russia is reduced, Victor
Gerashchenko may step down before the expiration of his term.'"
Ironically, some of the individuals pushing for his early departure
through legislative restriction of the Central Bank's status may be
limiting their own future authority.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that legislators are attempting
to take over the Central Bank. The Russian power elite is divided
on the subject of payment of all foreign and domestic debts in
2003."' Gerashchenko's goal of collecting $42-45 billion in Central
Bank reserves by the end of his term"c2 makes him unpopular with
98. Paul Starobin & Catherine Belton, The Kremlin is Launching a Major
Attack on Corruption, Bus. WK., Jan. 14,2002, at 46.
99. See A Newly Confident Putin, IPR STRATEGIC Bus. INFO. DATABASE,
Oct. 11, 2001 (indicating Promstroibank head Vladimir Kogan as a replacement
for Mr. Gerashchenko); Viktoria Abramenko et al., Did You Order a No-
Confidence Motion?, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., Feb. 21, 2001 (listing Vice President
of the Troika-Dialog Oleg Vyugin, executive director at the World Bank Andrei
Bugrov, Tatyana Parmonova, and Andrei Kostin as possible successors to Mr.
Gerashchenko); Putin Wants Structural Government, RUSSIA J., Feb. 2, 2001,
available at http://www2.russiajoumal.com/news/index.shtml?nd=4615 (last
visited Jan. 19, 2002) (suggesting Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov as a
replacement for Mr. Gerashchenko).
100. See, e.g., Victor Gerashchenko Has Survived the Great Atomic Route,
RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., Oct. 16, 2000; 'Russia's Greenspan' Said to be in Trouble,
IRP STRATEGIC BUS. INFO. DATABASE, Oct. 16, 2000; Liudmila Romanova,
Gerashchenko's Days are Numbered, DEF. & SECURITY, Oct. 15, 2000 (P.
Pikhnovsky trans.).
101. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the same
division regarding the same issue currently exists in Argentina as well.
10Z See Average Annual Dollar Exchange Rate to Lose 10-12% in Value in
2002, RosBUSINESSCONSULTING DATABASE, Dec. 11, 2001.
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those political elements that oppose full debt repayment.
Others in government, namely the Legal Department of the
Office of the President's Administration, also oppose the proposed
amendments. The Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia
George Luntovskii and the General Counsel of the Bank of Russia
Sergei Golubev have recognized that the recent position of
presidential lawyers leads to strengthening the State Duma without
increasing the influence of the President on the policy of the
Central Bank."°3
IV. THE CENTRAL BANK SHOULD REMAIN INDEPENDENT
The Bank of Russia will only be able to protect the stability of
the ruble when it is not threatened by the attempts of the State
Duma to bring the Central Bank under the Duma's control."w By
seeking to subordinate the Bank to itself, the Duma endangers the
independence that is vital to the Bank's effective performance of
its fundamental duty.105
The Central Bank has never been independent in a
constitutional sense. If the Central Bank had been absolutely
independent, the default of 1998' ° would never have occurred.
The default resulted from the practice in Russia of implementing
economic policy through politics'" rather than through the
103. ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: STATUS OF THE BANK OF
RUSSIA 38 (2001); CIVIL LEGAL STATUS OF THE BANK OF RUSSIA, (Peter
Barenboim & Vladimir Lafitsky eds. 2001).
104. See Jack, supra note 90.
105. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2 (1993).
106. In 1998 "Russia had defaulted on domestic debt, devalued the ruble, and
frozen payments on some Soviet-era commercial debt." Catherine Belton,
Western Banks to Russia: All is Forgiven, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2000),
available at http://www.businessweek.com12000/00_411b3702255.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2002).
107. Cf Prepared Testimony of Ariel Cohen, PH.D. Senior Policy Analyst for
Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
International Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation Before the House Banking
and Financial Services Committee Subject - the New IMF Credits to Russia and
Russian Economic Crisis, FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 10, 1999. "Most deputies in
the State Duma have been more concerned with their political survival in the
upcoming December elections than with passing legislation to improve the
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Constitution, demonstrating the clear gap between the written laws
and the decision-making process.
Further, it is important to distinguish between routine
problems of proper coordination between the Central Bank and
the Parliament, and the issue of the legal status of the Bank of
Russia. The establishment of effective working relationships can
be accomplished without changing laws, much less the
Constitution. The Bank of Russia is not included under the
legislative branch of power,"° which is the only circumstance in
which subordination to one of the chambers of the Federal
Assembly would be possible. Instead, Article 75 is a part of
Chapter 3 of the Constitution, entitled "Federative Structure.""
The duties and tasks of the Central Bank set forth that the
fundamental law of Russia give no legal grounds for the Bank's
inclusion in the legislative branch.' The Constitution does not
include the concept of subordination of any agencies or
departments to the State Duma and the term "podotchetnost" is
not used in the Constitution at all.
Nonetheless, if the concept of subordination of the Central
Bank to the State Duma was sustained, it could have broad
ramifications. In the end, Article 5 could result in the recognition
of a doctrinal interpretation of the Constitution that would allow
for the subordination of all constitutional bodies of the state power
to the Federal Assembly."' Such subordination would encompass
the president, the government, the courts, the prosecutor's office,
the human rights commissioner and authorities of the regions of
the Russian Federation.
A. Learning Lessons from Abroad
Countries with developed economies generally have
economy or repay the foreign debt .... Moscow's corruption and half-hearted
economic policies, aimed at preserving the vestiges of the Soviet military-
industrial complex, have destroyed the economy and bankrupted the country."
Id.
108. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 5.
109. Id. § 1, ch. 3, art. 75.
110. Id. pts. 2-3.
111. See supra Part. I.B.
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independent central banks."' However, the extent of this
independence varies significantly.113 Independent central banks
typically have strong commitments either to pursue price
stability, 4 follow a specific exchange rate policy,"' or comply with a
target explicitly stipulated by the government."6 Professors Alberto
Alesina"7 and Lawrence H. Summers"8 conducted the seminal
research in this area."9  They attempted to quantify the
112 See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 3 (1994), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/frspfl.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2002) ("The
Federal Reserve System is considered to be an independent central bank.");
http://www.ecb.int/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002) ("The Eurosystem is
independent.");
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/nb/nb.nsf/alldocs/Ftasksofthenationalbank
(last visited Jan. 20, 2002) ("The Nationalbank [of Denmark] is an independent
institution established by act of Parliament."). Cf Roberto Chang, Policy
Credibility and the Design of Central Bank, ECON. REV., First Quarter 1998, at 1,
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/publica/eco-
rev/REVABS/98er/ql/chang.pdf (noting a trend in many countries of "granting
central banks independence vis-d-vis other branches of their government").
113. See William Bernhard, A Political Explanation of Variations in Central
Bank Independence, AM. POL. So. REV., June 1998, available at
http://www.findarticles.comcf dls/mO259/n2_v92/20851299/pl/article.jhtml et seq.
(last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
114. Cf Chang, supra note 112 ("[A] trend influencing the nature of central
banking is for countries to formally state that a central bank's sole objective
should be the ensure price stability.").
115. See Prepared Testimony of James P. Healy Managing Director Global
Head of Emerging Markets Credit Suisse First Boston Before the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 23,
2000 ("Like many central banks throughout the world, the NBU administers
monetary and exchange rate policy .... ").
116. See Roger W. Ferguson, Why Central Banks Should Talk, Remarks at
the Graduate Institute of International Studies, (Jan. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/speeches/2002/20020108/default.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
117. Professor of Economics at Harvard University. For biographical
information, see http://www.fas.harvard.edul-ces/people/alesina.html (last visited
Jan. 10, 2002).
118. Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury and current President of Harvard
University. For biographical information, see
http://www.president.harvard.edu/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
119. Alesina & Summers, supra note 63.
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independence of central banks by creating an index of factors
employed by various banks."2° The index was comprised of various
indicators such as: how the formation of the board of a central
bank is determined, to what extent the bank is accountable to
legislative authorities, and whether the legislation creating the
central bank specifically addresses price stability."' The analysis
demonstrated that there is a remarkably clear statistical correlation
between the independence of central banks and lower inflation
rates that were prevalent in recent decades."
However an absolutely strict correlation does not exist. For
instance, it is widely known that the Bank of Japan is not among
the most independent banks, but the inflation in Japan remains
low." The Bank of Japan is required by law to pursue stability."
In recent years, Japan has had a combination of a weak macro-
economy" and strong yen,"' in addition to the large reserves of the
Bank of Japan." The Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan
120. Id. at 152.
121. Id. at 153.
122. Id. at 154.
123. See Masaru Hayami, The Role of Monetary Policy Under Low Inflation
in Japan, Opening Speech at the Ninth International Conference of the Institute
for Monetary and Economic Studies (July 3, 2000), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/rOO0706b.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2002) ("[During] the
1990s .... [Japan's] inflation declined to almost zero."). But cf.
http://www.businessweek.com/1997/02/b3509220.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002)
(indicating a 0.6% increase in the rate of inflation in Japan between 1996 and
1997).
124. Cf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/mission.htm ("The Bank of Japan's
missions are to maintain price stability and to ensure the stability of the financial
system, thereby laying the foundations for sound economic development.").
125. See III Announces Positive Operating Income for the 2"d Quarter 2001
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noted that: "In this kind of situation we have often faced difficulty
in drawing a line between 'internal stabilization' [of a weak
economy combined with a strong currency] and exchange-rate
stability.""
There have been several accusations from representatives of
Russian oil and other raw materials, that the ruble is too strong."
In August 2001, a similar sentiment was expressed by some
American business representatives regarding the dollar." It is a
common point of view among companies interested in increasing
exports.' Gerashchenko's efforts to maintain a strong exchange
rate for the ruble' have been challenged in Russia and could be
described as a misunderstanding of market forces.
system.").
128. BANK DE FRANCE, BICENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM: INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL BANKING 258 (2000). available
at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publi/main.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2002)
(comments of Yutaka Yamaguchi).
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2001, available at http://www2.russiajournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=5488
(last visited Jan. 20, 2002) ("[T]he ruble is fundamentally strong .... [I]t may be
too strong."); DAVID WOODRUFF, Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING? HIGH OIL
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http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm-0175.pdf (last visited Jan.
20, 2002).
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Aug. 17, 2001, available at http://www.cato.org/dispatch/08-17-01d.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002); Don Luskin, General Motors Against a Strong Dollar,
CAPITALISM MAG., Aug. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.capitalismmagazine.com/2001/august/dl-gm-strong-dollar.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002); Rich Miller & David Fairlamb, How to Avoid a Free-
Falling Dollar, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Aug. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_32/b3744058.htm (last visited
Jan. 20,2002).
131. See Chilean Peso Weakness Weighs on Economy, Boosts Costs,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 3, 2001 ("Some companies benefit from a weak
currency.").
132. See John Thornhill, Russia Upset by Politics in IMF Decisions, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, available at http://www.cato.org/dispatch/08-17-Old.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2002) ("Under [Gerashchenko's] direction, [the Central
Bank will] continue to maintain a steady exchange rate and anti-inflationary
stance.").
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Nonetheless, Russia will profit greatly from the exchange-rate
discipline imposed by the Bank of Russia. Market participants
generally act, based on very shortsighted speculations133 or
emotions." Investors often overshoot. Such speculation can be
reinforced or heightened by pressure from the Russian Parliament
and government officials. Some officials are sensitive to the
sentiments of big market participants and put pressure on the Bank
of Russia on behalf of those interests.
135
To pursue disciplined long-term policies of market
development, the Central Bank cannot be compliant whenever
large participants express negative sentiment. While a central
bank must be attentive to the concerns of its constituents, it is not
appropriate to simply formulate policy in favor of high-pressure
constituents. A central bank must independently evaluate what is
best for the economy and follow policies that further those
determinations. 13  Clearly, a central bank has to be independent
from the market.
Newspaper headings proclaiming "Falling Ruble, Rising
Inflation"' 7 and "Situation Surrounding Ruble Less Than Stable'
3
appeared immediately after July 6, 2000, when the public learned
133. See Moneyline (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 16, 1994) ("[M]arket
participants focus[] on the news of the day without taking into perspective the
long standing information present to them.").
134. See Further Downward Press Likely, Bus. TIMES, May 8, 2001 ("Greed
and fear the two most difficult 'trading emotions' which [are] evident amongst
market participants.").
135. Cf. Corruption in Russia: Hearing Before the House Banking General
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, 105' Cong. (1998) (statement of
Thomas J. Kneir, Deputy Director, FBI Criminal Investigative Division),
available at http://www.fas.org/irplcongress/1998_hr/980 9 1006_clt.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002) (discussing corruption among Russian officials).
136. See Peter Clark et al., An Evaluation of Alternative Monetary Policy
Rules in a Model with Capacity Constraints, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
42, 44 (2001) ("Many central banks devote considerable resources to modeling
and forecasting, and their public discussion of policy issues is increasingly cast in
a forward-looking mode.").
137. Nikolai Vardul, Falling Ruble, Rising Inflation, DEF. & SECURITY, July
10,2001.
13& Situation Surround Ruble Less Than Stable, RUSSIAN Bus. MONITOR,
July 10, 2001.
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that a case regarding the independence of the Central Bank had
been filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
These headlines reflected the close link in the public mind between
the strength of the ruble and the status of the Central Bank. In
Russia, the ruble remains the main currency for people instead of
the new currency.'39 In the eyes of the population, the value of the
Russian ruble is based on the independence of the Central Bank.
There is a strong constitutional basis underlying the popular
view that the value of the ruble is related to Central Bank
independence. One of the fundamentals of the constitutional
order of the Russian Federation is the unity of the economic
domain.'" In many respects, such unity is ensured by the unity of
the country's monetary system. The introduction and issuance of
any other currency in the country is prohibited by Part 2 of Article
75 of the Constitution."' Under the Constitution, issuance of
currency is within the responsibility of the Russian Federation and
only the Central Bank is entitled to issue currency.' 2 Moreover,
Part 2 of Article 75 of the Constitution firmly and explicitly secures
the principle of independence of the Central Bank. 3 "The
protection and the ensuring of the stability of the Ruble shall be
the fundamental duty of the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation, which it shall fulfill independently of other bodies of
state authority."'" Special independent constitutional and legal
status of the Bank of Russia may only be changed through revision
of the Constitution.'
45
139. Due to rampant inflation in Russia during the 1990's causing rubles to be
used in denominations of hundreds and thousands, President Boris Yeltin
reissued the ruble at 1/1000 of its previous value and reintroduced the Russian
Kopeck, the traditional coin currency of Russia, on January 1, 1998. See Daniel
Williams, New Ruble Has Russians Counting Their Kopecks, WASH. POST, Jan. 3,
1998, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/stories/kopecks010398.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2002).
140. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 1, art. 8, pt. 1.
141. Id. ch. 3, art. 75, pt. 2.
142. Id. pt. 1.
143. Id. pt. 2.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 1, ch. 3, art. 71, pt. a ("The jurisdiction of the Russian Federation
shall include the adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Russian
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Unfortunately, the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution is breached in a number of Articles of Federal Law
No. 394-FZ on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation,
enacted on December 2, 1990.'" These legal provisions provide the
possibility of State Duma interference in the activities of the
Central Bank, including the liquidation of the Central Bank
without amendment to the Constitution. 7 Such provisions make
the Bank of Russia dependent on short-term considerations of the
members of the Federal Assembly and create favorable conditions
for legislative intrusion into the constitutional competence of this
body."M
Constitutional provisions ensuring the legal status of the Bank
of Russia are of principal importance not only for the Russian
Federation as a whole, but also for its citizens. The lack of
certainty regarding the status of the Central Bank has had an
adverse effect on the prospects for the stability of the ruble and on
the investment climate in the Russian Federation."9  This
uncertainty predetermines the growth of inflation and creates
conditions for crisis situations in the economies of the regions,
especially those where the majority of individual savings are held
in the ruble.
For example, "Tverskaya Oblast"' is a region where the
welfare of the citizens depends entirely on the stability of the
[ruble]."' Most citizens of the Oblast hold their savings and
receive wages, as well as pensions and allowances in the national
Federation and federal laws and supervision over compliance with them....
see also Barenboim, supra note 12, at 18.
146. See Barenboim, supra note 12, at 18-19; see also Report About [sic]
Round Table of Nikitsky Club on March 1 of 2001, INDICATOR, Oct. 2001, at 27,
available at http://www.micex.com/downloads/pubs/ind_1001/1001 27-29.pdf
(last visited at Jan. 20, 2002).
147. See Barenboim, supra note 12, at 18-19.
148. Id. ("[These] provisions make the Bank of Russian dependent on
considerations of the moment and current inquires of the Federal Assembly and
create favorable conditions for intrusion of the legislators into the constitutional
competence of this body.").
149. Id. at 19.
150. Tverskaya Oblast is part of the Central Federal District of the Russian
Federation and is approximately 150 kilometers north of Moscow.
151. See Barenboim, supra note 12, at 19.
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currency.' A stable currency is one of the essential conditions for
maintaining an adequate living and free economic development.'
Hence, the proper legal status of the Bank of Russia as a unique
constitutional body revolves around the fundamental duty to
protect and maintain the stability of the ruble.'" Recognizing his
duty to the Bank of Russia and in fulfillment of his own duties, the
Governor of Tverskaya Oblast questioned the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation about the legislative limitations of
the constitutional functions of the Central Bank. "5
Constitutional theory has not determined the position of the
Central Bank in a system that is based on the separation of powers.
Some do not believe the Central Bank should remain
independent. "6 They believe that the Bank of Russia cannot be
assigned to any branch of power defined by Article 10 of the
Constitution, but that it has a unique status and is not subordinate
to other state authorities. In addition, these people support the
view that the Bank of Russia is among authorities that enjoy a
unique status.'58 Under this framework, the correct approach
would be to treat the Bank of Russia as a constitutional organ with
a specific status characterized by a lack of subordination to other
state authorities and by the exclusive and independent exercise of
its powers associated with monetary emission, and protection and
maintenance of the stability of the ruble. These powers are
fundamental duties of the Bank of Russia.
All existing central banks can be divided into three groups:
dependent, autonomic, and independent central banks.'59 The





156. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
157. Constitutional Conference Short Hand Materials, vol. 4 at 431-34; vol. 20
at 261-64.
158. M. V. Baglay, Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation. M., 1999, at
343-47.
159. Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Decline of the Nation State and its Effect on
Constitutional and International Economic Law: Contribution: The Role of a
Central Bank in a Bubble Economy, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1053, 1078 (1996)
("Other things being equal, an independent central bank is likely to have greater
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criteria for distinguishing among the three is in a direct
constitutional legal context.
Perhaps the Russian Constitution was too conservative with
the independence of the Bank of Russia, unlike its position with
jury trials" and freedom of settlement.6 The fight for the Central
Bank's independence is a recent Russian reality and a struggle for
democracy with a market economy. The definitions of
independence and accountability are a combination of legal and
economic perfection 62 and provide a good example of a
constitutional economic approach.
Only the future will show what price Russia will pay for the
instability of the issue of the constitutional and legal status of the
Bank of Russia. However, it should be remembered that an
independent Central Bank is unnecessary in only one case - where
the weakness of the economy predetermines the unlimited printing
of money. In this case, prices for goods will rise and the national
currency rate will fall. Only an independent central bank is able to
prevent excess inflation.
power to act against a bubble than a politically dependent one, since an
independent central bank has a degree of ability to take action autonomously, or
even against the will, of the political actors.").
160. KONST. RF § 1, ch. 2, art. 20; ch. 7, art. 123 (1993).
161. Id. at ch. 4, art. 85.
162. See supra Part I.B-C.
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